Introduction
The past decade witnessed an unprecedented expansion in Islamic finance, including a notable widening of operations of Islamic banks and extensive issuance of sukuk, investment certificates that comply with Islam's Shari'a legal code. 1 Recent figures indicate that Islamic banks operating in over 75 countries have total assets of about $300 billion and enjoy an annual growth rate exceeding 15% (Chong and Liu, 2009 ). The Financial Times estimates the value of industry overall in excess of $1 trillion (Financial Times Special Report, 2010) . Much of this expansion has been fuelled by sukuk issuance. Just as Islamic banks provide an alternative mode of financing compared to conventional banking, sukuk are similar in structure to conventional bonds but allow sovereign and corporate entities to raise funds in capital markets in conformance with Shari'a principles.
Islamic financial instruments were pioneered in the Far East (Malaysia and Indonesia) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. The issuance of sukuk rose from $7.2 billion in 2004 to $39 billion in 2007, with a global outstanding volume exceeding $90 billion (Jobst et al., 2008) . Sukuk today are also issued in other regions by sovereign, corporate, and international bodies such as the Saxony-Anhalt German State, GE Capital, and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). Perhaps most striking is that European governments (including France and Britain) have taken legal steps to accommodate sukuk issues in their countries. Among the motivations for this development in countries outside the Muslim world, it is hard to overlook the eagerness of Western governments to attract funds from the GCC countries to finance sovereign and corporate debt.
For sukuk to be Shari'a-compliant, three criteria must be met: 1) the certificates must represent ownership in tangible assets, usufruct or services of revenue-generating firms; 2) payments to investors should come from after-tax profits; and 3) the value repaid at maturity should reflect the current market price of the underlying asset − not the original amount invested. A debate was recently ignited after a leading Shari'a scholar announced that most sukuk do not comply with
Shari'a because they are in violation with at least one of the three principles, effectively making them no different than conventional bonds. Miller, Challoner, and Atta (2007) and Wilson (2008) similarly contend that sukuk instruments do not constitute financial innovation as they are generally structured along Western rules of securitization. Cakir and Raei (2007) offer that counterargument that sukuk are in fact distinct from conventional bonds as they offer unique risk-reduction benefits when added to a portfolio of fixed income securities.
This study goes to the heart of the debate over whether sukuk are financing instruments that mirror conventional bonds or have a distinct character. Here, we examine how a stock market reacts to sukuk and conventional bond issues by corporate entities to provide a comparative analysis.
Our approach appraises sukuk from two perspectives. First, putting aside theoretical and structural differences and similarities (including the views of Shari-a scholars), we ask simply whether stock market participants themselves distinguish between sukuk and conventional bonds.
We address market-based evidence on differences in company stock returns following issue announcements by applying an event methodology to examine whether announcements of sukuk and conventional bond issues lead to significant abnormal returns for the issuers. We then perform a market perception analysis on investor valuations of sukuk for insights into their future prospects.
While the issuance of sukuk is ostensibly motivated by religious principles, we ask whether extrinsic factors such as access to a new class of investors might also be involved.
Our study is topical in light of the recent expansion of sukuk. Determining whether investor valuation of sukuk is better or worse in comparison to conventional bonds, would allow us to project an optimistic or pessimistic view of the expansion of sukuk markets. This work broadens a fairly thin body of research on these still novel securities. Existing work on the emergence of sukuk appears in the context of overviews of Islamic finance (e.g. Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007; Visser, 2009) , and few studies investigate their evolution or specific characteristics (e.g. Jobst, 2007; Jobst et al., 2008) .
To analyze the stock market reaction to sukuk and conventional bond issuance, we consider (Jobst et al., 2008) , i.e. they are not limited to a small portion of the disintermediated financing for companies.
By way of preview, we find that there is an insignificant stock market reaction to conventional bond issuance and a negative reaction to sukuk announcements. We also report that there are significant differences in abnormal returns following the issuance of bonds and sukuk.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we provide an overview of sukuk and a literature survey. We present our empirical design in section 3, and discuss our findings in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
An overview of sukuk
This section starts with a discussion of what distinguishes sukuk from conventional bonds and recent market developments. We review the prospects and challenges facing sukuk, and conclude by addressing our main research question as to whether markets see sukuk as distinct from conventional bonds.
What are sukuk?
The new millennium opened with Islamic capital markets embracing Shari'a-compliant financial instruments known as sukuk.
3 Sukuk investments represent a distinct class of securities issued by sovereign and corporate entities. They are investment certificates with both bond and stock-like features issued to finance trade or the production of tangible assets. Like bonds, sukuk have a maturity date and holders are entitled to a regular stream of income over the life of the sukuk along with a final balloon payment at maturity. However, sukuk are asset-based rather than asset-backed securities, with the underlying asset being necessarily Shari'a-compliant in both nature and use. The eligibility of sukuk rests on identifying an existing or a well-defined asset, service, or project capable of being certified by a third party, and for which ownership can be recorded in some form. Sukuk holders might be responsible for asset-related expenses, and the sale of sukuk results in the sale of a share of an asset. Bonds, in contrast, are pure debt obligations issued to finance any activity and whose value rests on the creditworthiness of the issuer. Sukuk prices can vary both with the creditworthiness of the issuer and the market value of the underlying asset. However, while sukuk and shares of stock are similar in the sense that they represent ownership claims and that the return on both investments is not guaranteed, Sukuk must be related to a specific asset, service or project for a period of time. Equity shares, of course, represent ownership claims on the whole company with no maturity date.
In In a typical Ijara Sukuk structure, the originator sells assets to the sukuk issuer, a bankruptcy-remote special purpose vehicle (SPV) created to act as a trustee for investors acquiring the assets (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007) . 5 The assets are then leased back to the sukuk issuer for a stated period, with the agreement to sell the asset back to the lessee at the end of the lease period. 6 At the same time, the SPV issues certificates of participation to investors representing undivided ownership in the underlying asset. Over the term of the lease contract, the trustee receives rental payments for the use of the asset and distributes them to certificate holders in proportion to their ownership stake. 7 Upon expiry of the lease contract, the sukuk holder's ownership claims cease and the payment flow halts. The principal is returned to the holder and asset ownership reverts to the lessee. If the asset has a market value, the sukuk holder can realize a capital gain or loss. However, if the underlying is a public good for which there is no market, the sukuk holder exercises an embedded put option whereby the originator buys back the underlying assets at face value.
Alternatively, in a Musharaka Sukuk structure, the two parties include an originator providing a pool of assets and an SPV which raises cash by selling sukuk notes to investors (Abdulkader and Nathif, 2004) . These parties enter into a Musharaka (partnership) arrangement for a fixed period and agree on profit-and loss-sharing ratios. The issuer also undertakes to buy the Musharaka shares of the SPV on a periodic basis. The two partners then appoint a managing agent (usually the originator) to act on behalf of the Musharaka, and to develop or make efficient use of the asset(s).
In return, the agent gets a fixed agency fee and a variable incentive fee payable. The cash returns generated from the Musharaka are paid as profits to the Sukuk investors. At the end of the fixed Musharaka period, the issuer would have bought back the Musharaka shares at pre-agreed prices and intervals, and the SPV no longer has any shares in the partnership. Partnership contracts through Musharaka Sukuk strengthen the paradigm of Islamic finance and are preferred from the viewpoint of jurists because they rest on profit-and-loss arrangements. The returns on such participation certificates are contingent on the company fundamentals and not benchmarked to market rates. They are also attractive to investors because they are negotiable instruments that can be traded in the presence of an active secondary market.
A brief history of sukuk
Although sukuk were first issued in the 1980s, nearly all growth has come within the past decade.
According to Moody's (2007 Moody's ( , 2008 Table   1 shows the distribution of sukuk across corporate and sovereign issues over the period 2000-2007. DIFC, 2007) . 8, 9 Thanks to a special provision for non-profit trusts similar to English law, Malaysian law has played a significant role in developing the market for sukuk (Wilson, 2008 ). Malaysia's legal framework facilitates the establishment of the SPVs required for all sukuk to hold title of the underlying securitized assets and administer payments to investors.
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Given this favorable legal environment, sukuk issues proliferated in Malaysia and a secondary market that is much more active than in the GCC region developed there. 11 For the purposes of our study, therefore, we concentrate on sukuk from Bursa Malaysia. Figures 1 and 2 document the expansion of sukuk in Malaysia over the past decade.
At the international level, London seeks to retain its role in provision of Islamic financial services, signaling its intention with specific language in the UK Finance Bill 2007 (Miller, Challoner, and Atta, 2007) . The legislation was designed to give sukuk a level playing field with conventional securitization formats by providing tax treatment equivalent to similar financial products.
In late 2009, two issues marked a widening in the recognition and acceptance of sukuk outside the Islamic world (Parker, 2010b) . The first issue was the much-oversubscribed 5-year Aaarated $100m sukuk of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which was jointly arranged by HSBC, Dubai Islamic Bank and Kuwait Finance House-Bahrain. It was designed to increase funding for development activities in emerging markets, including the MENA region. Although small relative to mega-sukuk issues, it demonstrated that leading international institutions such as the World Bank acknowledge the importance of sukuk as a financing tool. The second issue was USbased GE Capital's 5-year $500 million sukuk to raise money for general corporate and balance sheet purposes. This "toe-in-the-water" transaction was seen as strategically important for GE as it raised funds from a new and important investor base.
2.3
Are sukuk that different from conventional bonds?
The recent controversy over whether some sukuk actually comply with the precepts of Shari'a suggests that sukuk are generally structured along Western rules of asset securitization. This raises the question of whether these innovative financial instruments are really all that different from conventional bonds. According to Miller, Challoner, and Atta (2007) , sukuk are structured to ensure an equivalent return to a conventional bond, with the difference that the return on the sukuk is generated from an underlying asset, not from the obligation to pay interest. Similarly, Wilson (2008) argues that financiers make special efforts to render sukuk identical to conventional securities so unfamiliar investors can assess the risk of these new investments. Such sukuk essentially mirror conventional securities, defeating the notion of product innovation coupled with distinctive and pricingrisk characteristics in the Islamic finance industry.
Shari'a scholars oppose the structuring of Islamic financial instruments to please international investors precisely because of this danger of making them conventional interest-based products. They dismiss the need for similarity with conventional bonds to bridge the gap between conventional capital markets and emerging Islamic securities markets to strengthen global financial integration. According to the President of the AAOIFI Shari'a Council, Mohammad Taqi Usmani, current practices of issuing Sukuk replicate the structure of conventional bonds in terms of lack of ownership, right to a fixed return, and the guarantee of repayment of principal. Usmani (2007) 12 value-at-risk (VaR) for a portfolio that includes both instruments to a pure eurobond portfolio. They find that the VaR is reduced when sukuk are added to the portfolio of fixed-income securities, demonstrating that these investment certificates create diversification benefits for investors.
For our purposes, we can forego the larger debate and ask whether the market itself perceives a difference between a sample of actively traded sukuk and bond instruments in Malaysia.
Empirical design
In this section, we provide a description of the data and relevant descriptive statistics, followed by an explanation of the methodology and presentation of the results.
Data and summary statistics
The sample of issues of sukuk and conventional bonds comes from Bloomberg, and spans 2002 to
2009. The sample size is determined by information availability on all requested variables, notably closing stock prices for companies issuing debt for a time span long enough before the announcement date of the issue in order to apply the market model and compute abnormal returns. Our final sample comprises 170 issues (77 sukuk and 93 conventional bonds). Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on our sample of securities classified by issue type.
On average, the conventional bond issues are considerably larger (314 million ringgit) than the sukuk (96 million ringgit). 12 The maturity is, on average, twice longer for conventional bonds than for sukuk (six-and-a-half years versus three-and-a-half years, respectively). The shorter maturity of sukuk could suggest that these financial instruments pay lower total returns in terms of both current yield and capital gains yield. However, the descriptive statistics show that the average coupon rate on sukuk is higher than for conventional bonds (4.06% versus 3.79%), and that Islamic securities in
Malaysia are issued at a deeper discount compared to conventional debt instruments (97.94% versus 99.17% of par) thereby offering greater potential for capital appreciation. These preliminary observations are interesting in the sense that higher promised returns on sukuk could be associated with higher investment risk, notwithstanding their shorter maturity. It also suggests that sukuk issuers are 12 Approximately $92 million and $28 million at the current exchange rate.
keen on offering greater return incentives to purchase their securities, who are unwilling to commit their funds for long periods.
To shed light on the nature and characteristics of different issuers of conventional bonds and sukuk, Table 3 provides descriptive statistics by issuer for each security. We find that companies issuing sukuk tend to be smaller than conventional bond issuers, both in terms of balance sheet assets and market valuation. These firms are also more indebted and exposed to greater financial risk. Sukuk issuers are less capitalized with an average equity-to-assets ratio below 20%, or half of the average 40% equity-to-assets ratio of conventional bonds issuers. Debt ratios are similarly higher than those of conventional bonds issuers. The long-term debt-to-assets ratio of companies issuing sukuk approaches 30%, while firms borrowing in the conventional market average around 20%. In normal economic conditions, greater financial risk likely translates into higher profitability levels. All profitability ratios listed in Table 3 indicate that they are worse for firms issuing sukuk compared to companies raising funds through conventional bonds. Indeed, the operating margins and ROA are negative for companies issuing sukuk, suggesting greater operating risk on top of their already heightened financial risk. In a nutshell, these observations point to a better financial and operating position for companies issuing conventional bonds that those engaging in sukuk issues, and that the shorter maturities and lower average amount of sukuk issues reflect lower-quality borrowers.
Sukuk issuers issued about double the average number of investment certificates (6.63 issues) than conventional bond issuers (3.10 issues). This finding comports with the fact that sukuk, because they tend to be smaller and have shorter maturities, require more issues.
Methodology and findings
Following the literature, we use a standard market model to estimate abnormal returns around the event date for a security issue. 13 Our sample period (2002−2009) contains 93 events for conventional bonds and 77 events for sukuk. The date of announcement is treated as day 0. We estimate market model parameters over the period (-100, -10) . This filter reduces the sample size to companies that have at least 100 days of stock returns observations. Using larger estimation periods (150 trading days) and stopping the estimation period up to 30 days before the event date has no affect on our results. We define returns as [P(t)-P(t-1)]/P(t-1), where P is the stock market daily price at clos- 15 We standardize CAARs using the square root of the product of the number of days in the event window and the mean square error. 16 We also use Patell (1976) , Boehmer et al. (1991) , and cross-sectional t-statistics and obtain similar findings. ently, the market does not react in a similar manner to these two types of issues and is capable of discriminating between them. This result reinforces our previous finding of a negative market reaction to sukuk issues in Table 4 .
We test the robustness of our results by using a different market model. In our sample, companies that issue conventional bonds do not issue sukuk, and those that issue sukuk do not issue conventional bonds. Since our sample exhibits market segmentation, it may be inappropriate to use the same market model for both types of companies. 17 From this perspective, stock returns for companies issuing different types of securities may be sensitive to different stock market indices. To address this, we perform two separate regressions to compute normal returns for companies issuing each type of security. The first uses the FBMEMAS index as a proxy of market return for companies issuing conventional bonds, and the second employs the FBMS Islamic index as a proxy for market return for companies issuing sukuk. 18 The rest of the methodology is exactly the same as described in sub-section 3.2. 19 We display the results using different market models in Tables 6 17 The average betas for companies issuing conventional bonds and sukuk are equal to 1.21 and 1.11, respectively, when employing the same market model with the FBMEMAS index to proxy for market return. Using a t-test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of betas equality. 18 The R² for the market model regression using the FBMS index equals 15.46%. It is slightly lower than for the market model with FBMEMAS index (18.47%). 19 One alternative is to apply Asset Pricing Theory and estimate normal returns using a Fama-French multi-factor model. We ruled out this approach for two reasons. First, recent evidence indicates that event study results are weakly sensitive to the type of specification used to compute returns and that simple models are more appropriate (Ahern, 2009 and the asymmetric event windows. We also note that, for this event window and the asymmetric event window [-2,1], the stock market reaction differs following the type of security issued, confirming that investors have a different perception of conventional bonds and sukuk issues.
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These additional robustness checks confirm and thus reinforce our earlier results. Overall, the Malaysian stock market is capable of distinguishing sukuk from conventional bond issues and stock market reaction is negative for sukuk issues.
Discussion
Our empirical results yield three insights related to sukuk and conventional bond issues: 1) the absence of significant stock-market reaction to conventional bond announcements, 2) the negative reaction to sukuk issues, and, 3) as a corollary, the significant difference in stock market reactions to sukuk and conventional bond issues.
The first finding of an absence of significant reaction of stock markets to conventional bond announcements is not at odds with former literature, which includes studies providing evidence that stock markets do not react to debt announcements including bond issuances (Eckbo, 1986; Mikkelson and Partch, 1986) , even if some find support for a negative reaction (Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1999) . The reaction of stock markets to the issue of bonds is influenced by opposing effects. Debt issuance may send a credible signal about the quality of firms, helping solve the adverse selection problem that results from information asymmetries between firm insiders and outsiders, and thus leading to a positive stock market reaction (Ross, 1977) . It can also reduce moral hazard behavior and agency costs resulting from conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers (Jensen, 1986) . On the other hand, stock markets could react negatively to debt issue events because greater debt may contribute to increasing moral hazard behavior under two scenarios. First, debt enhances the bankruptcy risk of the borrower, (since bankruptcy is associated with Second, the implementation of a multi-factor model requires information about company characteristics only available in limited cases. This would have drastically reduced the scope of our investigation. 20 We obtain similar findings using two asymmetric event windows and two different market model specifications.
the failure to repay due debt commitments); and second, debt increases the agency costs resulting from the conflicts of interest between shareholders and debtholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) .
Against this background, we interpret the absence of significant reaction to conventional bond announcements in the Malaysian stock exchange as the result of these opposing effects, which, again, is in line with findings of former studies.
However, we find a significant difference in stock market reaction to sukuk and conventional bond issues, following the negative reaction to sukuk issues compared to the insignificant reaction to conventional bond issues.
We suggest two explanations for this. Following the adverse selection argument, we propose that only borrowers with the lowest return expectations have an incentive to prefer sukuk.
Here, borrowers can choose between interest-based (conventional bonds) and profit-and-loss sharing (Sukuk) securities. If entrepreneurs expect a low profit, they prefer profit-and-loss sharing financing schemes to minimize their loss in the likely event of failure. If entrepreneurs expect a high profit, they prefer interest-based financing to maximize their gain in the likely event of success. As a result, stock market participants will expect the worst borrowers to choose to issue sukuk and will interpret such issuance as a negative signal on the financial position of the issuing firm. Kuran (2004) provides a similar argument to explain why many Islamic banks do not supply more equity-like financing instruments in line with the profit-and-loss sharing principle (Musharaka and Mudaraba) and in comparison with debt-based financing instruments. Since Islamic banks coexist with conventional banks in most countries, they are likely to face adverse selection problems if they only propose equity-like financing instruments. Borrowers with low expectations might opt for these instruments whereas those with high expectations will deal with conventional banks.
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As a second explanation, we propose that our finding could result from the excess demand for sukuk from Islamic banks. All banks (conventional and Islamic) have incentives to hold a portfolio of investment assets as they are more liquid than loans and yield a higher return than interbank loans. However, the liquidity needs of Islamic banks are accentuated by the lack of acceptable means to deal with the asset-liability mismatch inherent in banking operations. Islamic banks can-not borrow in the interbank market or at the central bank's discount window because such transactions involve the payment of interest. As Wilson (2004) argues, the vast majority of sukuk is held by Islamic banks because these financial instruments represent the backbone for the development of a much needed secondary Islamic capital market.
As a consequence, the existence of a strong demand for sukuk from Islamic banks associated with the limited supply of sukuk on the market leads to an excess demand for sukuk that makes these instruments easier to sell than conventional bonds. Thus, companies that are weak financially and unable to issue a conventional bond might still have access to financing through sukuk. Since the market anticipates this, it does not react positively to the issuance of sukuk. Furthermore, companies that are in good standing know that firms in bad shape must issue sukuk as they have been shut out of the conventional bond market. As a result, they have an incentive to prefer the issuance of conventional bonds to avoid sending a negative signal about their own quality.
Both interpretations of our findings are supported empirically by differences in the characteristics of the issuers of the two categories of securities. Companies issuing sukuk are typically in worse financial shape than those issuing conventional bonds, i.e. more leveraged and less profitable. These weaker companies can well have economic incentives to prefer issuing a security based on a profit-and-loss sharing principle rather than a fixed-income instrument that imposes a greater financial burden, and they may be shut out of the conventional bond market.
To determine whether it is the financial instrument or the financial situation of sukukissuing firms that ultimately contribute to the negative abnormal returns, we make an additional analysis. Thus, while we claim issuing sukuk leads to the negative market reaction, one could make the alternative argument that the weak financial characteristics of sukuk-issuing firms is what leads to the negative abnormal return. In that case, the instrument plays no signaling role as the stock market is capable of distinguishing among issuers according to their financial health within the sukuk category of financial instruments.
To investigate if the instrument matters for the adverse selection mechanism, we split our sample of sukuk-issuing firms in two subsamples according to the quality of the issuer and test the differences in abnormal returns for good and bad issuers.
If the instrument matters, we would expect to observe no significant difference in abnormal returns among issuers as all sukuk-issuing firms are similarly affected by the issuance of sukuk.
Conversely, if the financial situation is what matters, we should observe a significant difference in abnormal returns between good and bad sukuk issuers.
For these additional tests, only event windows for which our initial CAAR and standardized CAAR results were significant are used (i.e. [-2,2], [-2,1], [-1,2]). We only report results for the [-2,2] event windows for space reasons, but the results are similar with both other event windows. We consider five different financial ratios (equity to total assets, total debt to total assets, EBIT to total interest expenses, current ratio, operating margin, return on assets) to capture solvency, profitability, and liquidity characteristics of the issuer. We then split the sample according to the median of each ratio to create two subsamples of sukuk issuers (financially healthy and unhealthy) Table 8 displays the results of the tests of significance for the difference of CAARs and standardized CAARs according to the financial situation of the issuer. Overall, we find no significant difference in abnormal returns between sukuk-issuing firms in good financial shape and those in bad shape. This finding suggests that the market cannot discriminate issuer quality within the sukuk financial instrument category.
As a consequence, these findings strengthen the view that the sign of the abnormal returns observed for sukuk-issuing firms are driven by the financial instrument category, and confirm the role of sukuk issuance as a negative signal for the market.
Our major conclusion regarding the negative market reaction to sukuk issues in comparison with insignificant reaction to conventional bond issues has several implications. First, the fact that stock market investors are able to distinguish between sukuk and conventional bonds supports the view of Cakir and Raei (2007) that sukuk are indeed distinct from conventional bonds, and tends to undermine the arguments of Wilson (2008) and Miller, Challoner, and Atta (2007) . Although sukuk are similar in structure to conventional bonds (Usmani, 2007) , stock market participants perceive these instruments as special and react differently to their issuance.
A second implication relates to the evolution of sukuk and the predictions of strong growth of this market. While there may well be a variety of motivations for firms to issue sukuk, including religious factors, our analysis suggests a valid financial explanation. The fact that stock markets negatively perceive sukuk should deter healthy firms from the use of these securities as negative stock returns following a sukuk issuance could be detrimental to firm value, at least in the short run.
This would limit shareholder incentives to issue these investment certificates unless they know that they have no other access to financing.
The third implication concerns the economic effects of the expansion of sukuk on Islamic banks. Shari'a-compliant financial institutions hold sukuk on their balance sheet as liquidity manChristophe J. Godlewski, Rima Turk-Ariss and Laurent Weill Do markets perceive sukuk and conventional bonds as different financing instruments? 20 agement tools in the same way that conventional banks invest in fixed income securities. However, the industry suffers from the absence of a secondary market for trading sukuk, which prior literature has attributed to insufficient supply. If negative stock returns correlate with lower sukuk prices, the absence of sukuk trading may stem from a reluctance to post losses on these instruments. It is also possible that the negative market perception registered for sukuk issues might erode the image of the holders (i.e. Islamic banks) as well.
Conclusions
Using event study methodology on a sample of Malaysian public companies, this paper analyzed stock market reactions to announcements of sukuk and conventional bond issues. Our findings support the view that stock markets react differently to issuances of both securities. While there is no significant market reaction to conventional bond issues, we observe a significant negative stock market reaction to sukuk issues.
We attribute this different reaction of stock markets to the expectations of participants from two perspectives. On the one hand, investors expect that an adverse selection mechanism encourages less-healthy companies to prefer sukuk over conventional bond financing. Companies with low profit expectations have incentives to finance their project through sukuk as these instruments are based on profit-and-loss sharing schemes to allow them minimize their share in the loss. In contrast, companies with high profit expectations will opt for conventional bonds as it means a fixed repayment schedule and the maximization of their upside potential.
On the other hand, investors may take the view that even if companies issuing sukuk may have been shut out of the conventional bond market, they can still take advantage of excess demand for sukuk from Islamic banks. Indeed, analysis of our sample found that companies issuing sukuk tended to be in weaker financial and operating situations than companies issuing conventional bonds.
Our findings are relevant for two major debates in Islamic finance. First, Islamic finance is subject to criticism because its empirical application exhibits great similarity with conventional finance. Ayub (2007) observes that a major criticism of Islamic finance rests on the lack of differences with incumbent modes of finance. We provide countervailing evidence that stock markets are can readily distinguish between sukuk and conventional bonds. Thus, market-based information supports the existence of differences between instruments emerging from Islamic finance and those associated with conventional finance.
Regarding the economic effects of the expansion of Islamic finance, our results show that sukuk announcement likely leads to a negative market reaction that can adversely affecting firm value. In contrast, issuance of conventional bonds has a neutral impact on market capitalization.
Therefore, the increasing use of sukuk as currently structured and sold may be detrimental to firm values, at least in the short run.
As negative stock market reactions may limit incentives for companies to issue sukuk, market mechanisms are likely to curb the expansion of sukuk, despite the religious motivations. On the bright side, our results are related to the adverse selection mechanism that emerges from the coexistence of sukuk and conventional bonds on the Malaysian market. Such a mechanism cannot exist if only sukuk are issued on an exchange, implying that the negative reaction to sukuk issues would be reduced in a pure Islamic financial system. In any case, before considering large-scale adoption of Islamic finance, additional research is needed to assess the long-run implications of sukuk financing in economic development. measured with five financial variables (equity to total assets, total debt to total assets, ebit to total interest expenses, current ratio, operating margin, and return on assets). We use the medians of these five ratios to split the sample into financially healthy and unhealthy issuers. The medians are respectively equal to 38.55%; 35.21%; 2.55%; 1.65%; 11.23%; and 3.60%. We display the results for the event window [-2, 2] . For the first two tests, the null hypothesis is that the difference of CAARs (and standardized CAARs) between sukuk and conventional bond events is zero. For the Kruskal-Wallis test, the null hypothesis is that the sukuk and bond events samples come from identical populations. We use the FBEMAS index as a proxy of market return for companies issuing conventional bonds, and the FBMS index as a proxy of market return for companies issuing sukuk. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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